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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MILDRED D. DUBOIS, 
Plaint.ff-Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a divorce in which the plaintiff 
sought a division of the marital estate, almony and at-
torney fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The Court awarded the plaintiff a divorce on 
grounds of mental cruelty and then, having ultimately 
valued the marital estate at $581,911.00, awarded 
respondent 60% of that estate, permanent alimony in 
the amount of $375.00 per month and attorney fees in 
the sum of $10,000.00. Appellant appeals from all por-
tion of the Decree of Divorce excepting the awarding 
of the divorce. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the value of respondent's 
interest in the estate of Dr. Charles E. Hirth included 
in the marital estate; the property awardecl to respondent 
out of the marital estate, as expanded by the ahore, 
fixed at $307,000.00; and to have the alimony and at-
torney fees awarded to respondent eliminated entirely. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and respondent were married on Decem-
ber 13, 1!:142, in San Antonio, Texas. Two children were 
born to the parties, hoth of' whom arc now over the age 
1 
of 21. (T.T. 47-4-8)* On or about June 23, 1970, re-
spornlent filed a Complaint in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County seeking a decree of divoree on grounds 
of mental cruelty and praying for an award of an 
equitable portion of the marital estate, seeking alimony, 
and praying for an award of attorney fees. 
The case came on for trial before the Honorahle 
.l\larcellus IC Snow, District Judge of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County on .July 28, 2U arnl 30, 1!171. 
On August 4, 1971, the Court issued a memorandum 
opinion awarding the respondent an Interlocutory De· 
cree of Divorce; valuing the marital estate at approxi-
mately $570,000.00; awarding the plaintiff GO% of the 
marital estate as thus valued, establishing certain guide 
lines for the division of the estate among the parties, 
* (Note: T.T. refers to the Trial Transcript) 
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and awarding the respondent alimony and $10,000.00 
attorney fees. On January 10, 1072, the Court entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its 
Decree of Divorce, which confirmed the awards set 
forth in its memorandum opinion of August 4, 1971, 
with the exception that $581,011.00 was accepted as the 
Yalue of the estate rather than $S70,000.00. (F.F. 5-6) 
The court, howe,·er, failed to offer any explanation for 
this increase in the estate's valuation. 
The Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law expressly excluded from the marital estate any 
property which the respondent might succeed to by way 
of an inheritance from the estate of Dr. Charles E. 
Hirth. (F.F. 4)* Dr. Hirth died in ~lay, 1070, (T.T. 
144) approximately one month hefore the respondent 
commenced her action for a divo1Te. The respondent's 
intrrest in this estate has been valued at approximately 
$100,000.00 by respondent, less certain minor expenses 
associated with the upkeep of Dr. Birth's burial site, 
a bequest of $:!,000.00 to a church and the expenses of 
a<lministcring the estate. ( T.T. 83-84) The minimum 
net value of this inheritance to respondent was estimated 
as being between $7;3,000 and *100,000.00 (T.T. 198). 
In addition, the Court in its Findings of Fact failed to 
mention or include within the marital estate the expec-
tancy which the respondent has in her mother's estate. 
Uncontradicted evidence indicates, in reference to this, 
* (Note: F.F. refers to the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) 
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that respondent will he the sole beneficiary of her 
mother's estate, that this estate is valued at a minimum 
of $150,000.00, (T.T. 199) and that her mother is aged, 
feehle and living in a nursing home. ( T.T. 4i-48, 85-86, 
93 and 140-41) 
The Court also expressly found in its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law that the greater bulk of 
the assets of the marital estate was de-rived from gifts 
and inheritances received from respondent's side of the 
family. (.F.11""'. 2) The underlying and uncontradicted 
evidence indicates, however, that respondent received 
only a total of $117,i>O!l.OO in gifts and inheritance from 
her side of the family during the course of the parties' 
marriage (T.T. 22), and that appellant received a total 
of $66,137.00 in gifts ancl inheritances from respondent's 
side of the family during that same period of time. 
(T.T. 24) During that same time period, however, ap-
pellant contributed in excess of $500,000.00 in earned 
income to the marital estate. (T.T. 152). 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
TI-IE C 0 UR T COMl\IITTED RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR UY EXCLUDING 
FRO.l\1 ITS VALUATION OF THE 
l\IARI'l'AL ESTAT~~ THE VALUE OF 
RESPONDENT'S INIIERITANCE IN 
TIIE ESTATE OF DR. CHARLES E. 
IIIRTH AND BY FAILING TO PROP-
5 
ERL Y CONSIDER THIS INHERI-
TANCE AND THE RESPONDENT'S 
EXPECTANCY IN HER .1\IOTHER'S 
ESTATE WHEN IT DIVIDED THE 
:MARITAL ESTATE. 
A. Utah law requires that property interests 
which vest in either husband or wife prior 
to the dissolution of the marriage be in-
cluded within the marital estate and be 
considered by the court in adjusting the 
rights of the parties in that estate. 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law expressly excluded from the marital 
estate respondent's vested inheritance in the estate of 
her uncle Dr. Charles E. Hirth. (.F'.F. 4) The minimum 
value of this inheritance was established by the evidence 
as being between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00. (T.T. 
198) 
In lJicDonald v. 1llcDonald, 120 Utah 573, 576-83, 
23() P.2d 1066 ( 1951), this Court held that the trial 
court had properly taken into consideration, in adjust-
ing the financial affairs of the parties, an inheritance 
which the wife had received approximately one year 
before the initiation of the divorce proceedings in ques-
tion but subsequent to the commencement of the marital 
difficulties between them. Accord, 1llichel.'len v. lJiichel-
scn, 14 Utah 2d 328, 329-30, 383 P.2d 932 (1963}; cf., 
Woolley v. Woolley, 195 P.2d 743 (Utah 1948). It 
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should be noted that these cases arc in accord with the 
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions which have 
held that property interests vested in a party at the time 
of the divorce, although not presently rc(luced to that 
party's possession, are to be considered in adjusting the 
financial and property affairs of the parties. Schreiber 
v. Schreiber, 224 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1Hu9); Clarke v. 
Clarke, 188 N.E. 2d 619 (Ohio, 1963); Smyth v. 
Smyth, 179 P.2d 920 (Okla. 1947) 
B. Under Utah law contingent future in-
terests must he considered by the trial court 
in adjusting the parties' rights in the mari-
tal estate. 
In view of the court's award of sixty percent of 
the marital estate to the respondent from which it ex-
cluded respondent's veste1l inheritance in the estate of 
Dr. Charles E. Hirth, the approximate net value of 
which was established by the evidence as being between 
$7;'5,000.00 and $100,000.00, ( T.T. 198) it is clear that 
the court completely failed to give any consideration. to 
the respondent's expectancy in her mother's estate, 
which was valued hy uncontradicted testimony at a min-
imum of *J;>0,000.00. (T.'l'. 199), and whieh the trial 
court completely failed to mention in its Findings of 
]<'act and Conclusions of Law or in its l\Iemorandum 
Opinion, when it divided the marital estate. In lllac-
Donald v. ft! acDonald, ,11u pra, this court held that the 
wife's expectancy in the estate of her aged mother was 
rightly considered by the trial court in adjusting the fi-
7 
nancial affairs of the parties. 120 Utah at pp. 578 and 
582; cf., James v. James, 248 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Ky. 
1952), where the court affirmed a lump sum alimony 
award, which is akin to a property settlement award, 
which was based in part upon the husband's expectancy 
in his mother's estate, he being the only heir. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COl\11\IITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR BY ADl\IITTING EVI-
DENCE THAT WAS BASED UPON 
THE THEORY THAT THE l\IARI-
TAL ESTATE OF THE PARTIES 
WAS A TRUST CORPUS AND THE 
APPELLANTITSTRUSTEEANDBY 
ADOPTING THAT THEORY AS THE 
BASIS OF ITS DIVISION O:F THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
A. The Utah Courts have never interpreted 
or applied either U.C.A. Section 30-2-1, 
or Section 2 of Article XXII of the 
Utah Constitution relating to the emanci-
pation of married women, to the division 
and distribution of the marital estate in 
a divorce proceeding, but rather, have al-
ways treated the powers granted them 
under U.C.A. Section 30-3-5 as pervasive, 
allowing them to reach all of the properly 
of both the husband and the wife. 
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Respondent's attorney argued that since the rela-
tion of husband and wife is one of trust and confidence, 
any contribution to the marital estate by the wife or her 
family constituted a trust corpus, which, if managed hy 
the husband along with his contributions to the family 
estate, constituted him a trustee. ( T. T. 242-248) .l\lore-
over, according to this theory, when discord subsequent-
ly erupts between the parties, this trust relationship 
dictates that all of the trust assets, as originally contrib-
uted by the wife or her family, be traced, their produc-
tivity noted and a comparison made between their cur-
rent n1lue and a capitalized value utilizing an arbitrarily 
selected figure of seven percent. ( T. T. 26-3.5) Then, 
if the current value of these assets is less than their 
hypothetically calculated capitalized value, the husband's 
contributions to the marital estate are to be surcharged 
for the difference. Then, the actual or capitalized value 
of these assets, whichever is greater, is awarded to the 
wife as her separate property. (T.T. 22-34 and see 
plaintiff's Exhibits P-2 and P-3). 
_1\Iorcover, in calculating these values, you assume 
that all of the living expenses of the parties were paid 
out of the husband's contributions (T.T. 4:3), and you 
ignore any gifts or inheritances which the parties may 
have received from the husband's side of the family 
(T.T. 41). You also ignore the investment philosophy, 
goals, or practices of the husband ( T. T. 44) and you 
neglect to deduct, in calculating the capitalized value 
of the trust assets, any gifts which the parties may have 
9 
made to their children during the course of their mar-
ried lives ( T. T. 45) . 
Respondent's attorney recognized when he prof-
fered this theory to the court that there was no prece-
dent for it under Utah law (T.T. 242). However, not 
only is there no precedent under Utah law for the ac-
ceptance or use of such a theory, but this court has 
itself previously considered such a theory and flatly 
rejected it. Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 
P.2d 192, 193-35 ( 1967). In that case the plaintiff's 
wife appealed from a judgment of the trial court 
wherein she had been awarded one-third of the parties 
total net assets plus $200.00 per month as alimony and 
$900.00 for attorney fees. The defendant husband had, 
during the course of the parties' marriage, engaged in 
a variety of business ventures unrelated to his regular 
job. Unfortunately, these ventures suffered a number 
of severe reverses and, at the time of divorce, the 
marital estate had liabilities in excess of $71,000.00, 
with a net worth of approximately $10,000.00. The 
plaintiff argued on appeal that their business debts 
should "be paid by the defendant out of his earnings 
and that she should be awarded one-half of all property 
remaining· after these obligations ... [have been] paid 
in full." 4~~ P .2d at pp. 193-94. The court in response 
to this argument held that: 
"It is novel doctrine that would leave the hus-
band with the accumulated liabilities of 30 
years of married life and award to the wife 
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one-half of the net assets free and clear of 
these debts. Any business venture is accom-
panied by some risk of failure and to say that 
because the husband managed these invest-
ments it is his loss but that she will neverthe-
less share in the profitable portion of his 
financial endeavors, is an untenable sugges-
tion. She married him "for bette1 or worse." 
This does not mean the "better" for her and 
the "worse" for him. 422 P.2d at p. 194. 
This result is completely in accord with the gen-
eral rule that all of the property of the parties, includ-
ing their separate property is subject to the control, 
direction and disposition of the divorce court when the 
statute involved directs the court to make such disposi-
tions of the parties' property as it deems equitable. 24 
Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation§ 926. The statute 
which is controlling here, U.C.A. § 30-3-5, utilizes this 
language and this court has always interpreted the 
power granted it thereunder broadly. See, for example 
the "iJI acDonald and JJ-/ ichelsen, cases discussed, supra, 
under Point I. 
Not only was evidence based upon respondent's 
"Trust" theory erroneously admitted over appellant's 
objections, (T.T. 22, 34-35 & 46) but it is obvious from 
the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that it was influenced thereby in making its property 
award to the respondent. One example of this influence 
is the court's findings that the appellant abused the re-
11 
spondent's trust in him by creating an imbalance of in-
vestments in his own favor. (l ..... F. 2-3} 
l\Ioreover, it is only on the basis of such a theory 
that it would be possible for the court to find that the 
bulk of the assets in the marital estate had been pro-
duced from gifts and inheritances from respondent's 
side of the family. This is so because respondent's own 
testimony and evidence establishes that her side of the 
family during the course of the parties' marriage, con-
tributed only $117,509.00 by way of gifts or inheritance 
to her, and that they gave only an additional $66,137.00 
to the appellant. (T.T. 24} These figures ignore, of 
course, the value of the vested inheritance which re-
spondent will receive from Dr. Hirth. In contrast to 
the total contributions of approximately $183,000.00 by 
the respondent's family, $66, 137.00 of which was given 
to appellant and not to respondent, the appellant con-
tributed over $.300,000.00 in earned income. (T.T. 1.52} 
This uncontradicated evidence, coupled with the court's 
other findings, compels the conclusion that the trial 
court committed reversible error by admitting evidence's 
based on respondent's "Trust" theory and by adopting 
that theory as the means of allocating the property con-
tained in the marital estate. 
POINT III 
THE COURT CO.l\IMITTED REVERS-
IBLE ERROR BY AW ARD ING RE-
SPONDEN1.' ALIMONY. 
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A. Under Utah law, an award of alimony 
must be based upon the reasonable needs 
of the wife and in connection therewith, 
the court must consider those needs in re-
lation to all of her present and prospective 
assets. 
It appears to be generally accepted by most courts, 
including this Court, that the decision of whether or 
not to award a party alimony cannot be divorced from 
the property which the court awarded each party or 
from the total assets and resources of each party, in-
cluding contingent future interests. 
In Utah, the general rule is that an award of ali-
mony must be based upon the reasonable needs of the 
party concerned. Openshaw v. Opcn:~hmt, 12 P.2d 364, 
368 (Utah 19H2); and Allen v. Allen, 165 P.2<l 872 
(Utah 1946). Having determined what these needs are, 
however, the court must then determine the amount of 
alimony that will be necessary to satisfy these needs in 
relation to all of the assets of the wife, including the 
assets awarded to her in the divorce proceeding and those 
which she will likely succeed to in the future. 1Jl ac-
Donald v. JlacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 
( 1951); Cf. Stuckey v. Stuckey, 41 Cal. Rptr. 792 
(1964); ]Jenning v. ]Jenning, 362 P.2d 124 (Ariz. 
1961); Baugher v. Baugher, 408 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1965); 
Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1959); Rich-
ards v. Richards, 355 P.2d 188 (Haii. 1960). 
In the instant case the trial court awarded re-
13 
sporulent approximately $347,044.00 0f an estate val-
ued ultimately by the court at $581,911.00. The 
court, as noted above, expressly excluded from the 
estate respondent's vested inheritance from Dr. Hirth. 
l\Ioreover, there is no indication in the record or in the 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 
it took either respondent's inheritance from Dr. Hirth 
or her expectancy in her mother's estate into account 
when it awarded her permanent alimony in the amount 
of $37 5.00 per month. :l\Ioreover, the record is also 
barren of any evidence, other than generalized state-
ments by respondent that she enjoyed a high standard 
of living during the course of her marriage to appel-
lant, ( T. T. 56-69) arnl her own self-serving statement 
that she would need $750.00 per month in alimony to 
make ends meet, (T.T. 69) of what her needs are. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that even without 
taking respondent's expectancy in her mother's estate 
into account, respondent's total assets should produce 
approximately $29,.543.00 per year in income using 
seven percent as an average rate of return and assum-
ing that respondent's total assets would equal 
$422,044.00, which figure is the sum of the $347,044.00 
awarded respondent in this action and the minimum of 
$7 5,000.00 in inheritance which she will receive or has 
already received from the estate of Dr. Hirth. It is dif-
ficult to see how, in view of these facts, an award of 
$37 5.00 per month in alimony to respondent can be con-
sidered equitable or in any other fashion justified. 
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POINT IV. 
THE C 0 UR T COl\11\lITTED UE-
VERSIBLE ERROR BY AlVARDING 
RESPONDENT ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. Under Utah law an award of attorney 
fees to a wife in a divorce action is based 
upon her need and in connection there-
with, the court must consider all of the 
present and prospective assets of the wife. 
In Allredge v. Allrcdgc, 229 P.2d 681, 687 (Utah 
1951), this court held that the rationale for allowing a 
wife suit money and attorney fees is that she "normally 
has no separate estate from which to pay for bringing 
or defending the action." And in JV ciss v. 1Vo:ss, 111 
Utah 353, 364, 179 P.2d 1005 ( 1947), this court also 
held that aw~rds for attorney's fees and suit money 
may be made in the divorce decree "provided the neces-
sity for such awards is found to exist." Accord, Rieh-
ards v. Richards, 3;35 P.2d 188 (Haii. 19GO); and Hen-
ning v. ]Jenning, 362 P.2d 121 (Ariz. 1961). 
In the instant case, the respondent had, according 
to her own testimony, approximately $9,000.00 in sav-
ings in her name at the time the parties separated, (T.T. 
78) and she received thereafter, at appellant's request, 
(T.T. 148) the annual rent check from the Illinois 
farms in the amount of approximately $4,500.00 (T.T. 
69 and 77) .. Moreover, appellant paid all of the accrued 
15 
household hills before he left Utah in October, 1970 
(T.T. Hfl). Additionally, appellant, from the time that 
he separated from respondent in June, lfl70, until he left 
the state in October, 1970, made voluntary support pay-
ments to respondent (T.T. 68). Even more important, 
respondent was awarded $347,044.00 of the marital 
estate by the court which is over $110,000.00 more 
than the court awarded appellant. Additionally, 
respondent has a vested interest in Dr. Hirth's estate 
valued at a minimum of $75,000.00 (T.T. 198}, and 
an expectancy in her mother's estate valued at a mini-
mum of $150,000.00 (T.T. 199}. In view of the facts 
that respondent's assets greatly exceed appellant's and 
that she had sufficient income and liquid assets available 
to her throughout the course of this action to satisfy 
her needs and pay her bills, burdening appellant with 
the payment of respondent's attorney fees is unneces-
sary. inequitable and unconscionable. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S A'VARD TO RE-
SPONDENT \\THEN VIEWED AS A 
"THOLE l\'lANI~'ESTS AN INTEN-
TION ON THE COURT'S PART TO 
UNLAWFULLY PUN IS H APPEL-
LANT. 
A. Punitive measures have no place in Utah 
Divorce Law. 
16 
In 1Vilson 'l'. TVilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, 
979 ( 1956), this court expressly stated that, 
"l'Ve recognize that there is no authority in 
our law for aclministering punitive measures in 
a divorce judgment, and that to do so would 
be improper, except that the court may, and 
as a practical matter invariably does, consider 
the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties 
to their marriage vows, and their relative guilt 
or mnocence in causing the breakup of the 
. " marriage. 
The court also noted that rarely is there ever a 
"wholly guilty or a wholly innocent party to a divorce 
action." 296 P.2d at p. 979. The court then stated that 
the proper approach is for the court "to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their eco-
nomic resources so that the parties can reconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basis." 296 P.2d at p. 979. 
Accord, Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 
P.2d 192 ( 1967). 
In the instant action there is uncontradicted testi-
mony that appellant worked extremely hard ( 14-lG 
hours per day) throughout the course of this marriage 
and, as a consequence, generated earnings in excess of 
$500,000.00. (T.T. 152) The appellant did this in order 
to provide respondent with a very comfortable living 
and to amass the assets which are at issue on this appeal. 
On the other hand, respondent's only financial contri-
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hut ion to the marital estate, as valued hy the trial court, 
was the gifts a rnl ill heritances "hi ch she received from 
her family, ( T.T. 89) which only totaled $117,.509.00. 
N obvithstanding these fact:'> arnl the fact that re-
spondent is not suffering from any disability, the trial 
comt did the following things: excluded certain assets, 
contrary to Utah law, from the marital estate; adopted 
a theory in regards to a husband's management of 
the marital estate that is unique to Utah law and that 
has in fact been expressly rejected pre,·iously by this 
court; found against the weight of the evidence on the 
basis of that theory, that the marital estate, as valued 
by the court, had heen produced primarily from assets 
contributed by respondent's family; ordered the estate 
di,·ided on a 60-40 basis, an award which is unprecedent-
ed, for an estat~ as large as the instant one, under Utah 
law; awarded respondent alimony in the amount of 
*:375.00 per month despite the fact that there is no 
need for such an award in view of the assets available 
to and awarded to respondent by the court; and finally, 
awarded respondent attorney's fees in the amount of 
$10,000.00, although again there is no showing of need 
on respondent's part and although in fact respondent, 
by the court's actions, has been made a far wealthier 
person than appellant. 
All of these actions on the court's part when taken 
together clearly manifest an unlawful intent to punish 
appellant. These actions most certainly are not calcu-
lated to "minimize animosities" and aid the parties to 
18 
"reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful basis." 
JVilson v. fVilwn, 5 Utah 2d 79, 83, 296 P.2d 977 
(1956). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully re-
quested that the Court set aside the property, alimony 
and attorney's fees, awards of the trial court and exer-
cise the authority which it has in a divorce action to re-
view the record de not'o, 1Vilso11 t'. TVilson, 5 Utah 2d 
79, 84, 296 P.2d 977 (1956); and 1Viese v. TViesc, 24' 
Utah 2d 2:36, 2:38, 4G9 P .2d 504 ( 1970), by decreeing 
its own judgment denying respondent alimony and at-
torney fees, ordering the inclusion of respowlent's in-
heritance from Dr. Hirth in the marital estate, award-
ing appellant $:-l~!J.911.00 of that estate which would 
then be value at $G5U,911.00 (utilizing $75,000.00 as 
the value of respondent's inheritance from Dr. Hirth) 
and awarding respondent the remainder, which would 
come to $307;000.00. In the alternative, appellant re-
quests that the judgment of the district court be re-
versed in all particulars other than its award of a di-
vorce to respondent and that the cause be remanded 
with directions to eliminate the awards of alimony and 
attorney fees, to recalculate the value of the marital 
estate and to distribute it in accordance with the direc-
tions of this Court. 
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1972 
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Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORN\V ALL & l\lcCARTHY 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
Clifford L. Ashton 
Ray G. l\Iartineau 
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